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RECENT DECISIONS

liability is extremely difficult. It is suggested that for purposes of administrative
convenience responsibility should be imposed upon the person holding the stock
at the time of the bank's insolvency. "Statutes and constitutional provisions
which seem to point toward a different solution should be construed so as to
make them harmonize with this result' ZoLLmANN, 3 BANKS AND BANKING
§ 1614 . In Wisconsin, it is not the shareholders at the time the debt accrued, but
the shareholders at the time an action is commenced thereon who are individually
responsible for such debt to the amount of their respective shares. Cleveland v.
Burnham, 55 Wis. 598, 13 N.W. 677 (1882). The liability of a stockholder becomes fixed at the date of the judgment by which it is ascertained that the assets
of the bank have been exhausted and that the deficiency exceeds the amount
of his stock, and from that date he is liable. Cleveland v. Burnhan, 64 Wis. 347,
25 N.W. 407 (1885).
Section 221.42 of the Wisconsin Statutes (1937) limits the liability of a state
bank stockholder's liability to one year after written notice is given to the
banking commissioner of any transfer of stock, and liability attaches only to
the affairs of the bank at the time and prior to the date of the transfer. This
statutory liability terminates at the end of one year after written notice of the
stock transfer is given to the banking commissioner, even in cases where the
transferor knew of the insolvency of the bank and of the transferee's financial
irresponsibility and where the transferor intended to avoid statutory liability.
Cleary v. Bertrand,217 Wis. 622, 258 N.W. 799 (1935). To terminate such liability there must be compliance with the statute. The legal owner remains liable
as long as his name remains on the books of the bank, and fraudulent transfer
of stock to an agent or one who is financially irresponsible will not terminate
the legal stock owner's liability. Lochner v. State, 214 Wis. 109, 252 N.W. 695
(1934). Voluntary assessments paid by shareholders of a bank under Sections
220.07 (20) and 221.42 (1933) are independent from statutory liability and do
not give immunity to statutory liability, nor can such voluntary assessments be
applied to the statutory liability. In re Security Savings Bank, 217 Wis. 507,
259 N.W. 426 (1935). This is because the voluntary assessments are for the
benefit of the bank and the statutory liability is for the benefit of creditors. In re
Plain Bank, 217 Wis. 257, 258 N.W. 783 (1935). Stockholders can not claim as
a set off against their statutory liability the deposits in an insolvent bank.
Banking Ccnmiission, Receiver v. Bitker, 216 Wis. 497, 257 N.W. 616 (1934).
Whether satisfaction can be obtained against two stockholders, on the same
share of stock, has never been decided in Wisconsin. But the majority of states
having statutes like our own seem to hold that although two persons may be
liable, it "does not mean that the receiver can enforce full payment of the liability
against both." ZOLLmANN, 1 BANKS AND BANKING § 494.
Roy C. PAcKam.

AND

CORPORATIONS-PARTICIPATING OPERATION CERTIFICATES-WHO ARE CREDITORS
WHO ARE CO-ADVENTURERS?-The Sterling Oil Company, a Wisconsin

corporation, proposed to erect a filling station. For the purpose of financing the
cost of erecting the station,- the corporation, by authority of its stockholders
and its board of directors, issued "participation operation certificates." To secure
the repayment of the indebtedness, the corporation executed and delivered to the
plaintiff, as trustee, a deed of trust on all buildings, land, and equipment, such
conveyance being made "for the equal pro rata benefit and security of every
holder of any of the certificates' The purchasers paid $150 for each "partici-
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pation operation certificate" and $150 for one and one-half shares of Class B
non-par stock. The certificates and stock were sold in units for $300. The "participation operation certificates" provided that the holder was to receive one cent
for every gallon of gasoline and one cent for every gallon of kerosene sold by
the corporation, and 5 per cent of the gross sales in all other goods, "the fund
so created to be divided equally at the end of each month among the certificate
holders of such station and such distribution shall continue until such certificate holders shall have received $300 for each certificate, which sum the Company guarantees shall be paid on or before ten years. This sum shall be in full
of all profit and interest of every kind and nature and upon completion of payment thereof, all the right, title, and interest of the holder shall cease." The
trust deed was recorded. Subsequently, the defendant Sterling Oil Company
was adjudicated a bankrupt. Defendant has paid $169 from the fund created
on each certificate. The trustee in bankruptcy conveyed the premises to appellant Cosden Oil Company, the deed reciting that it was "subject to all legal
liens and incumbrances." The purchaser, the Cosden Oil Company, leased the
premises to the Pure Oil Company. In the action to foreclose the trust deed, the
trial court found that the rights of the Cosden Oil Company and the Pure Oil
Company are subsequent and subordinate to the plaintiff's claim. On appeal, held,
judgment affirmed; the holders of the certificates are creditors and not stockholders of the corporation within the meaning and wording of the "participation operation certificates." Kettenhofen v. Sterling Oil Company, (Wis. 1938)
275 N.W. 425.
The law is well settled that a certificate of stock does not make the holder
a creditor as well as a stockholder; he cannot be both creditor and debtor by
virtue of his ownership of the same certificate. Cring v. Sheller Wood Rim
Manufacturing Co., 98 Ind. App. 310, 183 N.E. 674 (1932). If a man is a stockholder, he takes a risk in the concerns of the company,, not only as to dividends
and a proportion of the assets on the dissolution of the company, but also as
to any statutory liability for debts in case the corporation becomes insolvent.
Miller v. M. E. Smnith Bldg. Co., 118 Neb. 5, 223 N.W. 277 (1929). If a man is a
creditor of a corporation, he takes no interest in the corporation's affairs, is not
concerned in its property or profits as such, but his whole right is to receive agreed
compensation for the use of money he furnishes, and the return of the principal
when due. Whether he falls into one category or another depends on a proper
construction of the contract he holds with the company. Spencer v. Smith, 201
Fed. 647 (C.C.A. 8th, 1912). Furthermore, some legislative scheme may expressly
authorize the issue of stock which will give the holders the rights of creditors,
and a lien on the property of the corporation which will have priority over the
claims of subsequent creditors, and at the same time give them all the incidents,
rights, and privileges and immunities and subject them to all liabilities to which
the ordinary stock of the corporation or holders thereof are entitled or subject to.
Heller v. National Marine Bank, 89 Md. 602, 43 Atl. 800 (1899); Kingston Cotton Mills v. Wachovi Bank and Trust Co., 185 N.C. 7, 115 S.E. 883, 29 A.L.R.
251 (1923). Whether or not the holders of certificates like those in the instant
case are to be regarded as stockholders or creditors, it is said, is a matter for
interpretation. Hazel Atlas Glass Co. v. Van Dyk & Reeves Inc., 8 F. (2d) 716
(C.C.A. 2d, 1925). The nature of the transaction is to be determined by the
substance and effect of the contract which is being foreclosed, rather than by
the name given to the security or the obligation, To call a thing by its wrong
name does not change its nature. Koeppler v. Crocker Chair Co., 200 Wis. 476,
228 N.W. 130 (1929). The important inquiries that must be made are whether
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a date is fixed within which the company is bound to pay up the "shares," and
whether it appears that the parties intended that the interests of the "shareholders" be subordinated to the interest of the creditors at large in case the
company should become insolvent. Kidd v. Puritan Cereal Food Co., 145 Mo.
App. 502, 122 S.W. 784 (1909). Where no time is fixed when the principal shall
become due and payable, the certificate itself cannot create a debt. Jefferson
Banking Co. v. Trustees of Martin Institute, 146 Ga. 389, 91 S.E. 463 (1917).
It has been held that the fact that certificates provide that they "shall be a
preferred lien on the assets of the Company" does not make the holder a creditor, when it is manifest from the certificate construed as a whole that the
corporation never intended to make him one, but merely to give him a lien
on the assets of the corporation when in liquidation, over the common stockholders. Weaver Power Co. v. Elk Mountain Mill Co., 154 N.C. 76, 69 S.E. 747
(1910).
In the instant case there was a definite promise to pay a fixed sum within a
fixed period. The separate instruments apparently contained all the essential elements of promissory notes. In a case where the promotion scheme was comparable to the one carried out in the instant case and where the participating
"operation certificates" were secured by a trust deed on all the premises, the
court held that the holders were profit-sharers and co-adventurers. United States
and Mexican Oil Co. v. Keystone Auto Gas and Oil Service Co., 19 F. (2d) 624
(W.D. Pa. 1924). It is important to notice that in the latter case no fixed date
for payment was prescribed in the certificates. And in the latter case the controversy developed between holders of the certificates and a receiver representing general creditors over the fund which had been built up from percentage
contributions out of gross sales. In the instant case the controversy was not one
between the certificate holders and general creditors. The corporation had been
adjudged a bankrupt. The properties had been sold by the trustee in bankruptcy.
At the time no issue between certificate holders and general creditors with
respect to recourse against the company's assets or the proceeds from the sale
had been raised. The purchaser from the trustee took with notice of the
asserted encumbrance. It does not appear how much the purchaser paid. It is
submitted that the equities are with the certificate holders as against a purchaser like the one in the instant case who probably paid little more than enough
to carry the costs of the bankruptcy administration. But the court's apparent
willingness to decide this case according to its "interpretation" of the instruments may be hard to explain if the court ever has to decide a case just like
the Keystone Gas Co. case.
EDWARD J. KuLiG.

CORPORATIONs-SERvICE OF PROcEss-FoR'IGN CoRPoRATioNs DOING BusINEss

WITHOUT A LicENsE.-The defendant, an automobile manufacturer, pleaded in
abatement to the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that no valid service
was made as it was not present or found in the state. Prior to November, 1935,
the defendant had a Boston distributor who contacted all the dealers. The sales
were understood to be made at Detroit and the distributor was not an agent.
The distributor went out of business in November and a district manager took
over the duties so the local dealers could get automobiles. His office was in a
building which was owned by a corporation and the stock of such corporation
was owned entirely by the defendant. The defendant sent him its own stationery
to use. He sent all the dealers' orders on to Detroit. He arranged for the show-

